Fixing a Deflation: A Most Intelligent Analysis

I have reprinted in total an interview between fund manager Ray Dalio and Barrons. This is the most detailed and well-thought-out description of what is a deflation and how it is repaired that I have seen. It echoes my thoughts and commentary almost verbatim, but with a lot more detail and credibility. Read on to understand what is happening and how we get out. I will put my commentary in brackets[]:

http://online.barrons.com/article/SB123396545910358867.html?page=2&page=sp

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2009 INTERVIEW

Recession? No, It's a D-process, and It Will Be Long

Ray Dalio, Chief Investment Officer,
Bridgewater Associates

By SANDRA WARD

AN INTERVIEW WITH RAY DALIO: This pro sees a long and painful depression.

NOBODY WAS BETTER PREPARED FOR THE GLOBAL market crash than clients of Ray Dalio's Bridgewater Associates and subscribers to its Daily Observations. Dalio, the chief investment officer and all-around guiding light of the global money-management company he founded more than 30 years ago, began sounding alarms in Barron's in the spring of 2007 about the dangers of excessive financial leverage. He counts among his clients world governments and central banks, as well as pension funds and endowments.

"The regulators have to decide how banks will operate. That means they are going to have to nationalize some in some form." No wonder. The Westport, Conn.-based firm, whose analyses of world markets focus on credit and currencies, has produced long-term annual returns, net of fees, averaging 15%.

In the turmoil of 2008, Bridgewater's Pure Alpha 1 fund gained 8.7% net of fees and Pure Alpha 2 delivered 9.4%. Here's what's on his mind now.

Barron's: I can't think of anyone who was earlier in describing the deleveraging and deflationary process that has been happening around the world.

Dalio: Let's call it a "D-process," which is different than a recession, and the only reason that people really don't understand this process is because it happens rarely. Everybody should, at this point, try to understand the depression process by reading about the Great Depression or the Latin American debt crisis or the Japanese experience so that it becomes part of their frame of reference. Most people didn't live through any of those experiences, and what they have gotten used to is the recession dynamic, and so they are quick to presume the recession dynamic. It is very clear to me that we are in a D-process.

Why are you hesitant to emphasize either the words depression or deflation? Why call it a D-process?

Both of those words have connotations associated with them that can confuse the fact that it is a process that people should try to understand.

You can describe a recession as an economic retraction which occurs when the Federal Reserve tightens monetary policy normally to fight inflation. The cycle continues until the economy weakens enough to bring down the inflation rate, at which time the Federal Reserve eases monetary policy and produces an expansion. We can make it more complicated, but that is a basic simple description of what recessions are and what we have experienced through the post-World War II period. What you also need is a comparable understanding of what a D-process is and why it is different.

You have made the point that only by understanding the process can you combat the problem. Are you confident that we are doing what's essential to combat deflation and a depression?

The D-process is a disease of sorts that is going to run its course. When I first started seeing the D-process and describing it, it was before it actually started to play out this way. But now you can ask yourself, OK, when was the last time bank stocks went down so much? When was the last time the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, or any central bank, exploded like it has? When was the last time interest rates went to zero, essentially, making monetary policy as we know it ineffective? When was the last time we had deflation?

The answers to those questions all point to times other than the U.S. post-World War II experience. This was the dynamic that occurred in Japan in the '90s, that occurred in Latin America in the '80s, and that occurred in the Great Depression in the '30s. Basically what happens is that after a period of time, economies go through a long-term debt cycle -- a dynamic that is self-reinforcing, in which people finance their spending by borrowing and debts rise relative to incomes and, more accurately, debt-service payments rise relative to incomes. At cycle peaks, assets are bought on leverage at high-enough prices that the cash flows they produce aren't adequate to service the debt. The incomes aren't adequate to service the debt.

Then begins the reversal process, and that becomes self-reinforcing, too. In the simplest sense, the country reaches the point when it needs a debt restructuring. General Motors is a metaphor for the United States.

As goes GM, so goes the nation?

The process of bankruptcy or restructuring is necessary to its viability. One way or another, General Motors has to be restructured so that it is a self-sustaining, economically viable entity that people want to lend to again.

This has happened in Latin America regularly. Emerging countries default, and then restructure. It is an essential process to get them economically healthy.

We will go through a giant debt-restructuring, because we either have to bring debt-service payments down so they are low relative to incomes -- the cash flows that are being produced to service them -- or we are going to have to raise incomes by printing a lot of money [Exactly, but keep reading, the story gets even better].

It isn't complicated. It is the same as all bankruptcies, but when it happens pervasively to a country, and the country has a lot of foreign debt denominated in its own currency, it is preferable to print money and devalue.

Isn't the process of restructuring under way in households
and at corporations?

They are cutting costs to service the debt. But they haven't yet done much restructuring. Last year, 2008, was the year of price declines; 2009 and 2010 will be the years of bankruptcies and restructurings. Loans will be written down and assets will be sold. It will be a very difficult time. It is going to surprise a lot of people because many people figure it is bad but still expect, as in all past post-World War II periods, we will come out of it OK. A lot of difficult questions will be asked of policy makers. The government decision-making mechanism is going to be tested, because different people will have different points of view about what should be done.

What are you suggesting?

An example is the Federal Reserve, which has always been an autonomous institution with the freedom to act as it sees fit. Rep. Barney Frank [a Massachusetts Democrat and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee] is talking about examining the authority of the Federal Reserve, and that raises the specter of the government and Congress trying to run the Federal Reserve. Everybody will be second-guessing everybody else.

So where do things stand in the process of restructuring?

What the Federal Reserve has done and what the Treasury has done, by and large, is to take an existing debt and say they will own it or lend against it. But they haven't said they are going to write down the debt and cut debt payments each month. There has been little in the way of debt relief yet. Very, very few actual mortgages have been restructured. Very little corporate debt has been restructured.

The Federal Reserve, in particular, has done a number of successful things. The Federal Reserve went out and bought or lent against a lot of the debt. That has had the effect of reducing the risk of that debt defaulting, so that is good in a sense. And because the risk of default has gone down, it has forced the interest rate on the debt to go down, and that is good, too.

However, the reason it hasn't actually produced increased credit activity is because the debtors are still too indebted and not able to properly service the debt. Only when those debts are actually written down will we get to the point where we will have credit growth.

There is a mortgage debt piece that will need to be restructured. There is a giant financial-sector piece -- banks and investment banks and whatever is left of the financial sector -- that will need to be restructured. There is a corporate piece that will need to be restructured, and then there is a commercial-real-estate piece that will need to be restructured.

Is a restructuring of the banks a starting point?

If you think that restructuring the banks is going to get lending going again and you don't restructure the other pieces -- the mortgage piece, the corporate piece, the real-estate piece -- you are wrong, because they need financially sound entities to lend to, and that won't happen until there are restructurings.

On the issue of the banks, ultimately we need banks because to produce credit we have to have banks. A lot of the banks aren't going to have money, and yet we can't just let them go to nothing; we have got to do something. But the future of banking is going to be very, very different. The regulators have to decide how banks will operate.

That means they will have to nationalize some in some form, but they are going to also have to decide who they protect: the bondholders or the depositors?

Nationalization is the most likely outcome?

There will be substantial nationalization of banks. It is going on now and it will continue. But the same question will be asked even after nationalization: What will happen to the pile of bad stuff?

Let's say we are going to end up with the good-bank/bad-bank concept. The government is going to put a lot of money in -- say $100 billion -- and going to get all the garbage at a leverage of, let's say, 10 to 1. They will have a trillion dollars, but a trillion dollars' worth of garbage. They still aren't marking it down.

Does this give you comfort?

Then we have the remaining banks, many of which will be broke. The government will have to recapitalize them. The government will try to seek private money to go in with them, but I don't think they are going to come up with a lot of private money, not nearly the amount needed.

To the extent we are going to have nationalized banks [Citi, BAC for sure, as I have maintained; they are already Fed controlled, if not completely nationalized], we will still have the question of how those banks behave. Does Congress say what they should do? Does Congress demand they lend to bad borrowers? There is a reason they aren't lending.

So whose money is it, and who is protecting that money?

The biggest issue is that if you look at the borrowers, you don't want to lend to them. The basic problem is that the borrowers had too much debt when their incomes were higher and their asset values were higher. Now net worths have gone down.

Let me give you an example. Roughly speaking, most of commercial real estate and a good deal of private equity was bought on leverage of 3-to-1. Most of it is down by more than one-third, so therefore they have negative net worth. Most of them couldn't service their debt when the cash flows were up, and now the cash flows are a lot lower.

If you shouldn't have lent to them before, how can you possibly lend to them now?

I guess I'm thinking of the examples of people and businesses with solid credit records who can't get banks to lend to them. Those examples exist, but they aren't, by and large, the big picture. There are too many non-viable entities. Big pieces of the economy have to become somehow more viable. This isn't primarily about a lack of liquidity. There are certainly elements of that, but this is basically a structural issue. The '30s were very similar to this.

By the way, in the bear market from 1929 to the bottom, stocks declined 89%, [note: in 1929 the DJI stocks were very extended and had the same kind of PEs as 2000. When stocks tanked in 2008, the PEs were much lower because the air was already let out of the stock market, so we will not need to see a DJI of 1400 before this is over. We probably already has seen the DJI low] with six rallies of returns of more than 20% -- and most of them produced renewed optimism. But what happened was that the economy continued to weaken with the debt problem. The Hoover administration had the equivalent of today's TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program] in the Reconstruction Finance Corp. The stimulus program and tax cuts created more spending, and the budget deficit increased.

At the same time, countries around the world encountered a similar kind of thing. England went through then exactly what it is going through now. Just as now, countries couldn't get dollars because of the slowdown in exports, and there was a dollar shortage, as there is now. Efforts were directed at rekindling lending. But they did not rekindle lending. Eventually there were a lot of bankruptcies, which extinguished debt.

In the U.S., a Democratic administration replaced a Republican one and there was a major devaluation and reflation that marked the bottom of the Depression in March 1933. [The timing of the change in Presidents is remarkable in its similarity. The market decline and recession started in 1930 and two years later, there was an election. This time, the housing market peaked in 2006 and two years later, there was an election. I think we are in early 1933 if we use the Great Depression as our reference. That was a great time to get long the stock market]

Where is the U.S. and the rest of the world going to keep getting money to pay for these stimulus packages?

The Federal Reserve is going to have to print money [my blog friends who fear the printing press need to pay attention here. This point is why I discount what I hear from Marc Faber, Jim Rogers and Peter Schiff. They don't know their history]. The deficits will be greater than the savings. So you will see the Federal Reserve buy long-term Treasury bonds, as it did in the Great Depression [this answers the question about who will lend us the money to back the printing press]. We are in a position where that will eventually create a problem for currencies and drive assets to gold [which, in this context, is okay. I am long gold, but I am also long our economy].

Are you a fan of gold?

Yes.

Have you always been?

No. Gold is horrible sometimes and great other times [because its only value is as an alternate currency or jewelry. Gold has NO inherent value. It is an unproductive asset]. But like any other asset class, everybody always should have a piece of it in their portfolio.

What about bonds? The conventional wisdom has it that bonds are the most overbought and most dangerous asset class right now.

Everything is timing. You print a lot of money, and then you have currency devaluation. The currency devaluation happens before bonds fall. Not much in the way of inflation is produced, because what you are doing actually is negating deflation. So, the first wave of currency depreciation will be very much like England in 1992, with its currency realignment, or the United States during the Great Depression, when they printed money and devalued the dollar a lot. Gold went up a whole lot and the bond market had a hiccup, and then long-term rates continued to decline because people still needed safety and liquidity [this is a point that changes my thinking a bit. I think in terms of either / or; but Dalio makes the case for an overlap of the appreciation of both asset classes].

While the dollar is bad, it doesn't mean necessarily that the bond market is bad. I can easily imagine at some point I'm going to hate bonds and want to be short bonds, but, for now, a portfolio that is a mixture of Treasury bonds and gold is going to be a very good portfolio, because I imagine gold could go up a whole lot and Treasury bonds won't go down a whole lot, at first.

Ideally, creditor countries that don't have dollar-debt problems are the place you want to be, like Japan. The Japanese economy will do horribly, too, but they don't have the problems that we have -- and they have surpluses. They can pull in their assets from abroad, which will support their currency, because they will want to become defensive.

Other currencies will decline in relationship to the yen and in relationship to gold [hmmmm, I don't know if "less bad" is good enough for me. I think Japan is in this with the rest of us; though recent currency action supports Dalio's case here].

And China?

Now we have the delicate China question. That is a complicated, touchy question. The reasons for China to hold dollar-denominated assets no longer exist, for the most part. However, the desire to have a weaker currency is everybody's desire in terms of stimulus.

China recognizes that the exchange-rate peg is not as important as it was before, because the idea was to make its goods competitive in the world. Ultimately, they are going to have to go to a domestic-based economy. But they own too much in the way of dollar-denominated assets to get out, and it isn't clear exactly where they would go if they did get out. But they don't have to buy more. They are not going to continue to want to double down.

From the U.S. point of view, we want a devaluation [YES!! this is the point I always make: we must create inflation to get out of this problem, thereby devaluing the dollar]. A devaluation gets your pricing in line. When there is a deflationary environment, you want your currency to go down. When you have a lot of foreign debt denominated in your currency, you want to create relief by having your currency go down. All major currency devaluations have triggered stock-market rallies throughout the world; one of the best ways to trigger a stock-market rally is to devalue your currency.

But there is a basic structural problem with China. Its per capita income is less than 10% of ours. We have to get our prices in line, and we are not going to do it by cutting our incomes to a level of Chinese incomes.

And they are not going to do it by having their per capita incomes coming in line with our per capita incomes. But they have to come closer together. The Chinese currency and assets are too cheap in dollar terms, so a devaluation of the dollar in relation to China's currency is likely, and will be an important step to our reflation and will make investments in China attractive. [this is a major thesis of mine, and I own FXI, the China equity index fund and will buy more. This is a long term phenomena that will last my lifetime. China will be the major source of commodity demand for decades, so commodities are a great investment here]

You mentioned, too, that inflation is not as big a worry for you as it is for some. Could you elaborate?

A wave of currency devaluations and strong gold will serve to negate deflationary pressures [YES!! another of my points: inflation cancels deflation], bringing inflation to a low, positive number rather than producing unacceptably high inflation [this is the point where Faber, Rogers and Schiff are most wrong because they do not acknowledge the role of cancellation of deflation] -- and that will last for as far as I can see out, roughly about two years.

Given this outlook, what is your view on stocks?

Buying equities and taking on those risks in late 2009, or more likely 2010, will be a great move because equities will be much cheaper than now. It is going to be a buying opportunity of the century.

Thanks, Ray

.

Refuting the Arguments of Gold Bugs

Today, I answer the blogposts of a couple of gold bugs who are a little overwrought with the idea of a new age where gold is king:

"Another Case for Gold": http://livingoffdividends.com/2009/01/31/another-case-for-gold/comment-page-1/#comment-32504


"Boy, Nirav, is the author of this piece mixed up. There are parts of it that are correct, but the overall picture is decidedly mixed and confused.

You and I have been in agreement that gold and other precious metals and hard assets will benefit from a period of monetary expansion once the deleveraging is done. I believe that as long as dollars are printed to replace the financial assets lost in write-downs, there is no inflationary pressure created: no extra demand chasing too little supply. (and in fact, we are now entering a period of excessive inventory, whether houses, cars or clothing, which is the source of all deflations).

But once inventory (supply) is back in balance, then all the excess money supply (demand) will probably cause inflation. How much inflation will be determined by how fast the Fed and Treasury can remove the dollars from circulation. One way is as the author described: by selling Treasuries. But this also is the source of one of his misdirections. Here are the errors I saw in his arguments:

1. “if the Fed floods the market with Treasuries, it will achieve exactly the opposite effect it’s looking for — it will cause rates to rise” - POINT: when the Fed uses this policy of selling Treasuries to reduce monetary supply, it is INTENTIONALLY trying to raise interest rates (see Paul Volcker in 1980). Interest rates must go up to attract buyers to Treasuries. That is the whole point, which addresses another of his confused arguments:
2. “Do you really think the Chinese and the Japanese are going to buy Treasuries at a 2% yield if the Fed is panicking and trying to buy dollars to stop an inflationary price explosion?” POINT - NO, of course not. The Fed already knows it will need to raise interest rates to attract capital to Treasuries once de-leveraging (fear) is out of the market. The very low rates of today are a product of global fear of economic failure. I find it very interesting that global wealth is flowing to the US dollar through Treasuries and not to Gold. It really refutes the Gold Bug argument, doesn’t it?
3. “They’re not going to fund an inflationary dollar at 2%. Ever.” POINT - DUH!! Come on, the author of this piece seems smart and well-educated, but this statement makes me wonder. First, the mechanism for issuing debt of any kind, government or corporate, is through auction. The 2% rate is a product of what the market will bear, not some Federal fiat. Interest rates of all types are set by the market, not be some pre-ordained decision. The Fed officials (really, any one educated in economics) understand that when we enter a period of excess money supply (we can only wish for that right now), then interest rates will be bid higher.
4. The reason for this is also Economics 101: investors are only concerned with the REAL return of an investment, not the NOMINAL return. The real return is the investment return minus inflation. So, the market will ALWAYS require a return that is positive or in excess of inflation. 2-2.5% is the normal expected REAL return for a riskless investment (Treasury). How do we know this? It is quoted every day in the Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). When inflation is negative, as it is right now with a contracting GDP, very low interest rates still generate positive Real Returns.
5. “[In the past] the U.S. money supply was much smaller, and our ability to borrow was much stronger. But those days are gone.” POINT - many younger writers, or those not solid students of economic history, forget the context of “the past”. In the 1950s and early 60s, America’s economic nexus, America was the only country with its economic infrastructure left intact after World War 2. America was never bombed or invaded and its manufacturing infrastructure had been built to the sky in support of the Western World’s war machine. Because hard assets were plentiful, soft assets (currency) were not widely needed. People miss this very important point. Currency is just a substitue for real or hard assets. Those assets can be buildings, machinery, coal, oil or gold. American then, like China now, had lots of assets and against those assets, loaned the rest of the world money so they could rebuild theirs. When you loan money, money supply contracts, just as when you borrow money in expands.
6. The author (and most goldbugs) forget that currencies are comparative. If the entire world prints more money in concert, how can any harm be done? The dollar is just a unit of measure that represents economic exchange. Each dollar represents a fractional claim on the national aggregate assets of America. When I was a small boy, $1 meant a lot (could buy 3 loaves of bread). Today, $1 is probably represented by $10 in making purchases (still buys 3 loaves of bread). Does that change my life in any way? NO. Does it change my buying power in any way? NO. As long as my income is 10 times what it was before (and on average for Americans, it is), it is a wash. No one cares. And as long as the rest of the world follows the same path, it matters not. But, if you hold Real Assets over that time period (gold or real estate, among others), they will hopefully be worth 10 times as much, but probably no more (at least not for long). So, does that ounce of gold today buy any more than it did in 1972? NO. Money is symbolic and comparative, and to try to make some case for a new paradigm for Gold is as hopeless and mindless as those who tried to dismiss it entirely 10 years ago.

My Projections for 2009

How bad was 2008 from an investment perspective? From Barrons issue on January 5: "The S&P 500's 37% loss of 2008 served to knock three-quarters of a percentage point off the annualized index total return since 1927, to 9.7% from 10.4%, according to Aronson+Partners. The 10-year trailing returns for large-cap stocks now appear to be at their worst level since 1827, says Morgan Keegan, and trailing returns of world equities versus bonds are at their weakest since the late 1970s, says BCA Research."

So, combined with the Tech Bust in 2001-03, we could say we are simply in the worst period for investors in 200 years. We should have "mean reversion" at some point. It has to get better!! The article goes on to say: "the lousy risk adjusted record for stocks that now dominate investors' memory is discrediting equities in the public mind as a wealth-building asset class." For those with a 20 year time horizon, this is what we want to hear. I was very worried a couple years ago when volatility had gone to less than 10 (as measured by VIX). Low market price volatility goes with a perception of low risk. When the market loses its risk, it also loses its prospects for return.

For the stock market to achieve its typical 4-6% real return (the return above inflation), there must be a perception of risk. If there is no risk, then returns will be only 1-2% over inflation (see TIPS returns as an example), and the ability to grow wealth by market investing will be lost.

Santoli goes on in his Barrons article: "This is helpful, and implies the direction of mean reversion for asset classes will favor stocks again before long, though who knows from what ultimate level? The five years following the 10 worst calendar years for stocks were always up in total -- sometimes not much, sometimes a lot, an average of about 10% annualized -- yet three times the year immediately afterward was down more than 20%."

All this is good and sounds very reasonable. But the title of this post is "Projections for 2009". I know you are looking forward to my annual amusing, but rarely insightful projections. I understand that by January 4, you have already seen more than enough forecasts. But I have been doing this since 2002 now (except last January when my crystal ball was all cloudy), so I don't want to break the string (though I just admitted I did last year). Here goes:

• Government backed interest rates (mortgages and Treasuries) will stay low throughout 2009 (less than 1% for 2 year bonds); but sometime thereafter, maybe early 2010, they will start rising and continue going up as inflation heats up along with an economic recovery.
• By the July 2009, the high yield and corporate bond interest rates will begin to decline, narrowing the historic spreads against risk free Treasuries
• Crude oil will continue weak throughout 2009 in a range of $25 -$60 per barrel; as a result production and exploration will be reduced and lower production with higher demand will set the stage for a rebound to over $100 sometime in 2010 or 2011; enjoy low gasoline prices while you can;
• Gold prices will stay under $1000 in 2009, but will not decline under $600; but gold could increase to over $1500 by 2012 because of a weaker dollar caused by inflation from excess money supply created in 2009;
• In early 2009, GM will be forced to declare bankruptcy (or an equivalent government reorganization); same for Chrysler; this will set the stage for a revamping of the American auto industry and will usher in a new era of manufacturing competitiveness; Ford will escape bankruptcy, but will benefit from the changed labor and franchise rules;
• At least five major mall retail brands will declare bankruptcy and will be closed; candidates: Abercrombie, Zumiez, GAP, Hot Topic, Lane Bryant, Foot Locker, Eddie Bauer, Ann Taylor; but look for the retail sector to outperform as soon as 2010;
• General Growth may become a victim both due to the above store closings / bankruptcies, but also due to the debt it took on to acquire Rouse Companies; its survival depends on selling several of the Rouse flagship properties: Fanueil Hall (Boston), Harborplace (Baltimore) South Street Seaport (NYC) and its Las Vegas malls (Forum Shoppes, Fashion Mall, Highland Mall);
• Official unemployment will top 8%, but will not top 10%;
• Mortgage rates for 30 year fixed rate Fannies will be less than 4.5% with no points; but these rates will rise in 2010;
• The stock markets will see a range and return by year end of DJI: 7000 - 10,500 (13%); S&P500: 725 - 1100 (15%); NASDAQ100: 1400 - 2200 (10%); with the lower end of the range reached in the first half of the year (there will be a retest of the November low, but that retest will be the bottom of a new 20 year secular Bull market, albeit the new Bull will be sleepy for several years while the economy and debt are repaired);
• The best asset class return in 2009 will be in high yield bonds (junk) with a 30% total return;
• The 2nd best asset class return in 2009 will be in energy stocks, both producers and equipement providers, though producers will have the best total return at 25%;
• The worst asset class in 2009 will be Treasuries with 30 year bonds returning a negative 20%;

What is Next for our Economy and Currency?

Reading Barrons today, I came across a good piece by editor Thomas Dolan. It reflects on where we are as a nation and world in respect to our economic system(s). It questions what will be the new-world order for exchange. I will paraphrase and add my own comments:

""The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression is claiming another casualty: American-style capitalism." The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, has announced, with neither a trace of an accent nor a trace of sarcasm, that "Laissez-faire is finished."" And that is good, isn't it? Laissez-faire as a recipy for economic disaster. Humans are driven by greed and fear. Left alone in a capitalist economic system, people will try to maximize their own personal gain at the expense of their fellow man, the definition of greed. SOME regulation is required to keep man from hurting himself in his primative drive for economic gain.

As Dolan quotes and interprets, correctly in my opinion: "In one of the more lucid passages of Das Kapital, Karl Marx said, "In every stockjobbing swindle everyone knows that some time or other the crash must come, but every one hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbor, after he himself has caught the shower of gold and placed it in safety. 'Après moi le déluge!' is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation.""

America is painted by some as the land of greed, and in fact, many in this land act greedily and without regard for their fellow man, as will most people given the opportunity and means, and with NO limits or regulation. It did not help that after World War 2, America's was the only significant economy left standing in the world. Because America had the only functioning industrial complex, by lieu of geographic isolation and friendly status with the border nations of Mexico and Canada, when world finance leaders met in New Hampshire in 1944 to repair the world financial system, the decision was made to index all other currencies to the US Dollar, and the dollar to gold in what was called "Bretton Woods".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system

As Thomas Dolan continues: "(The agreements reached at "Bretton Woods" were) dictated by the United States. It reflected the astounding dominance of America in the world economy (near the end of) World War II. The U.S. accounted for 40% of global economic output and had at least 80% of the gold reserves. Only the dollar was credible enough to be pegged to gold; other currencies could be pegged to the dollar. Thus, the U.S. became the world's creator and judge of money."

"The U.S. eventually abused its power to create the world's money, flooding the globe with unwanted dollars in such profusion (during the Johnson Presidency years of "guns and butter" during Vietnam and civil unrest), that it couldn't redeem them for gold (when foreign Central Banks so tried in 1971). In 1971 (the US governmnet) admitted that, went off the gold standard and left the world and itself with no restraints on the creation of money and credit."

I don't think it is possible to go back on the gold standard, nor is it wise. Gold and other forms of hard asset economic regulation do not reflect the ability of mankind to grow its economic value. Humans are creative and productive. We can make more with less as we apply intellect to practical problems of life. A currency fixed to a finite amount of gold does not reflect this fundamental truth. This is why gold as financial proxy does not now and never has worked.

What is needed is a GLOBAL method to measure in real time, human productivity and growth, and index the sum of tradable financial instruments to the sum of all productive capacity. This will allow economic growth without artificial restraint, but will also allow expansion without risk of inflation and currency devaluation. Accompanying this new form of financial index should be investing and banking regulations that are tight enough to ensure transparency of all financial structures and transactions, along with limits to leverage; but still loose enough so as to not choke off risk taking that leads to economic expansion and opportunities for everyone.

How can this be done across all economies around the planet? Greater minds than mine will need to figure this out. But it is worthy for global leaders to try to find a way. Do we need a Bretton Woods 3?

Commodity Prices Peaking?

Regarding the commodity price discussion by Stephen Leeb in a recent newsletter, I think we can have it both ways, both the Barrons and WSJ positions. We are in the midst of a "short term" correction in commodity prices. Basically, the price increases got ahead of themselves at a time of weakening demand. The commodities markets are heavily influenced by speculative cash flows in today's market. It has become a favorite play ground of hedge funds and hot money. The size of the commodities markets is relatively small compared to the amount of funds available to chase those commodities, so the prices are easily moved around by speculative money flows. I agree with the 30% correction forecast by Barrons, and we are just about half way there on gold with the price in the upper 800s.

But I also agree with the WSJ article which makes the case for supply constraints as the "long term" problem for commodities pricing. New supplies of natural resources and ag products are hard to bring on line. Demand will not create instant new supply like it might for financial products or electronics, which are very easy to ramp up in terms of production (all financial products require is a paper and pen). New mines or oil wells require land acquisition, permitting, support infrastructure (roads, power, etc), labor in places where it may not be already available (Northern Canada), large capital funding, plant design and engineering, etc. And as the most accessible resources are tapped out, the remaining resources are in harder and harder to develop locations (mining seems to go with mountainous terrain for example).

So, I think we can consider both arguments and invest accordingly. If you like to trade short term, like me, the trade now is to be short the commodities. But if you are more of a buy and hold investor, then the proper trade is long. And the new lower prices make this a decent entry point for gold, copper, iron, etc. Ag commodities will also be a good buy if they pull back a bit more.

How to Play Commodities

Q: How far can the price of oil go? What are good ways to play the commodities markets over the next 5 years?

A: I don't have any problem with the idea of $200 oil any more than I do $2000 gold. The only question is "When"? That will depend on supply, demand and the dollar. Hard to forecast the exact direction of all the variables for any point in time. But, I think it is safe to say that supply for raw materials / commodities is hard to quickly expand, due to the infrastructure required. So, any increase in demand due to an expanding global economy, will drive prices higher.

The dollar may or may not get much weaker. At some point, the other countries will defend their own currency by either buying dollars, dropping their interest rates, or both. Emerging markets dependent on higher employment rates to keep their citizens happy, cannot allow Americans to take back jobs due to a cheap dollar. So, there is a practical limit to dollar weakness, at least in the short and mid-term (one month to five years).

But we are seeing the beginning of a correction to commodities right now, so I would wait to make a move. The Fed's defense of our banking system and economy are supportive of the dollar. This action will move money from the defensive position of precious metals and oil back to the stock market, which will deflate prices over the next couple months (or however long the rally runs). I would be prepared to move money into commodities gradually, over a long time horizon.

As for vehicles, I have always like FNARX, which is Fidelity's natural resource fund. It has done very well. I am in GGN, but it has been a bit disappointing. DBA is a good way to play the ag market. OIH and IXC are a good way to play the oil market. And, of course, I am in love with VGPMX for precious metals and have been for more than five years. But it is closed now.

Commodities Near a High?

Q: Did Cramer signal the end of the Gold run by shrieking its praises in his show last night? He gushed about the coming $1600 Gold price (along with $16 wheat, and $16 Nat gas, which may suggest the gold target was more about numerical alliteration than calculation).


A: Well, the commodity boom can't continue if the recession talk gets worse. Commodity demand has to decline with a globally weaker economy. All the price increase can't be explained by dollar weakness. So, I am expecting a big selloff in the commodity stocks as they have been driven up by speculation and a thin market (not so much equity chased by a lot of dollars). Gold and oil will be part of that selloff, along with the ag commodities. For this reason, I am light on all the commodities, which are the current bubble. (The fact that Cramer is pounding the table for commodities seals that prognosis for me).

But after a big blowoff, they will be strong again and continue to rise as economies recover around the world, probably late next year. The dollar should strengthen later this year when other govmts cut their own interest rates to reflect the global recession that has begun. A strengthening dollar will also help lower commodity prices in dollar terms for the next 12-18 months. By the end of 2009, there should be another gold and oil buying opportunity with gold at $700 and oil at $70. That is my take, anyway.

In the meantime, the Canroys should be fine on a cash flow basis, as they are only factoring $60 oil into their cash flow and dividend forecasts. They will probably sell down on price, though, if this all comes to pass.

Gold: An Investment for Decades to Come

Jake, Thanks for the newsletter. I am pretty much in sync with this writer's perspectives.

My thoughts on gold have not changed much in several years. I think it is a store of wealth and will do better in times of inflation and dollar devaluation (which mostly run together). Even if gold stays steady and goes no where against other national currencies, as long as the dollar goes down, gold will go up by the same amount, just as other dollar denominated commodities do, like oil.

Additionally, there is the risk premium put on gold for an uncertain world and, probably most importantly, the future demand that will come from Asia. Gold is favored in Asia throughout history, so that is not likely to change soon. As Asians have more disposable income, they will buy more gold, and will increase global demand. Also, the Asian (and Middle Eastern) economies will grow rapidly over the next 20 years (10% a year on average, perhaps) and will probably need 10% more a year of gold reserves to back their currency, and maybe more as they lose confidence in the dollar and shift their reserves towards gold and sell dollar instruments like US Treasuries.

So, for many reasons, I think gold is good for many years. The only reason it did poorly the past 30 years was that the dollar took the role of global reserve currency and the global central banks, especially the US and Europe, sold off their gold reserves adding supply and dropping demand. I don't think the dollar will get that "Reserve Currency" role back anytime soon after all the losses incurred by governments and dollar investors around the world the past couple years.

As you know, I own gold through VGPMX, GGN and best of all, BEARX. Even though BEARX is a bear market fund, it held its own even in the years when stocks were in bull mode because of its gold holdings. It is half shorts and half a gold / precious metals fund, with lots of junior gold producers that will do very well if gold prices continue higher.

Hope this helps.

Why Invest in Gold and Precious Metals?

Brian, Your thoughts on Gold/Precious Metals.
I recently bought some Freeport Gold & Copper FCX and it is up 15% in one week. The price of gold is $745+-. Many analysts are saying that Gold will double in 2 years. Should I buy more? What percentage do you have in Gold/Precious Metals?

Jake, Even though I really like FCX and have owned it in the past (going back to 1999 when it was Freeport-McMoran C&G), it is not a gold pure play. It is as much copper as gold (and other minerals), but it is a very good China play since most of its mines are in Indonesia and an “anti-dollar” which is the key value of gold right now, as the dollar dives. Another good stock very similar to FCX is BHP.

I have been using funds to create a core position in precious metals and then dabbling around the edges with option contracts on the miners. My favorite gold fund is VGPMX, but it may be closed right now. It has done great the past three years I have owned it (41% annualized return over 3 years). I started buying another fund, GGN, early this year when VGPMX was closed. GGN is a “natural resource” fund and so has a lot of energy stocks as well as gold and basic materials. It also has a very good yield at 6%. There are other good precious metals funds that can be found on Morningstar or other websites.

Once I have my core position, I trade around the edges when the stocks are moving up. Precious metals and basic material stocks are very volatile, so they create good trading and option opportunities. I have been playing with AU, GG and AUY. The latter is a small cap and so very volatile. It is also a darling of the day trading crowd, so really moves fast. I just closed out my positions on AU that I have held off and on for four years. I will get back into AU when it approaches $40 again. I will probably sell put options to get in. Same is true for GG which I closed out in June when it was around $27. Now it is over $30, so probably got out too early. I just got back into AUY this week as it is well below its 52 week high. I sold (20) October 12.50 put contracts for 0.65 each on Friday (worth $1300 on Oct. 19 if AUY finishes above $12.50). That price is still good and will be on Monday (with the price of AUY at $13). I am looking for $15 or $16 in the next 6 weeks if gold stays at these levels.

Selling put options, you may end up with the stock if the price drops. That has happened to me with all the gold stocks along the way. If it happens, I just hold the stock knowing that the price is volatile and I will have a chance to get out at a profit. This is what I just did with the AU (Anglogold) and GG and AUY in the past.

Other conservative gold plays include the bullion ETF (GLD). You could also look at the silver ETF (SLV). Large cap miner possibilities are Newmont (NEM) and Barrick (ABX).

I think gold might double in 2-3 years from this level. It depends on the Fed and tax / spending policy. As long as we run fiscal deficits and also cut interest rates / create excess money, we will continue to see a devaluing dollar which encourages the price of gold to rise. If Congress and the Fed decide to protect the dollar, by raising interest rates and taxes and/or cutting Federal spending, then gold will decline in value. But I am not betting on that in the short term (during an election year).

Energy, Gold and BRICs

Here is more fodder for consideration:

Energy, as a percentage of the S&P500, peaked at over 20% in 1980. It then declined to near 6% in 2000. Now it is back at 10%. So, the price of energy stocks could double versus the rest of the market before they were historically overvalued / near a top.

Gold is a similar story. Gold relative to oil also peaked in 1980 at $800 versus oil at $40 per barrel. Normalized for inflation the past 20 years, the comparable price of oil would be $100, which means the comparable price of peak gold would be $2000. If the dollar continues to decline, then dollar inflation relative to 1980 (as a baseline) will increase this equation and $150 oil and $3000 gold at the next peak. If the pattern from the 70s repeats and we are at about 1972 right now (using the Bretton Woods II thesis), then we would see this scenario play out by 2015.

The above scenario is given a fixed world market for oil and gold. But it can be argued that the global supply of both gold and oil is tighter in 2007 and the demand is greater with the development of the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China). So, lots of upside.

Bretton Woods 2: Wither American currency?

I had to share this article with you. It is a reminder that relative global interest rates and their effects on currency exchange rates are what really matter in investing. All the rest is just noise.

China and the ROW have been financing America for a long time, at least since 9/11, by buying up our Treasuries in exchange for the dollars they get from exporting to our consumers. This has allowed our interest rates to remain artificially low and has encouraged consumption and spending, including the housing bubble. It has kept our financial markets (and financial stocks like banks and brokers) strong and supported full employment (by financing production of consumer products and services).

So what happens when this trend reverses? Interest rates go up, financial assets including housing prices go down and inflation erupts. Eventually, unemployment increases and we get a recession. Through all of this, the only safe place to be, relatively, is in hard assets like oil and gold. The real value of hard assets remains constant through time, which means they increase in value relative to a declining currency like the dollar. Here is the article by economist Randall Forsyth in today's Barrons:


Bretton Woods II: About to Follow the Original?
IS BRETTON WOODS II heading for the same fate as its predecessor?

Bretton Woods is shorthand for the postwar international monetary system, named for the New Hampshire resort town where its blueprints were laid out by the Allies in the latter days of World War II. The rules called for currencies' exchange rates to be fixed against the dollar, whose value in gold was set at $35 an ounce.

In reality, however, foreign central banks would buy dollars to keep their currencies from rising in violation of the Bretton Woods rules. That would require the central banks to expand the supply of deutschemarks, yen or francs, to purchase the excess dollars, which was inflationary. Finally, when they started demanding gold for their dollars, then-President Richard Nixon closed the gold window on Aug. 15, 1971. About a year and a half later, the dollar would float along with the currencies of the other major industrialized nations.

The improvised, more-or-less floating exchange-rate system has prevailed since 1973, about as long as the designated-hitter rule in baseball, and equally unsatisfactory to purists.

Bretton Woods II arose not from some formal treaty but as an ad hoc response to the Asian financial crisis that began 10 years ago next month. Then, the currencies of most of East Asia were informally pegged to the dollar. The Thai baht came under attack, and the pegs of much of the rest of the region's currencies were threatened in turn.

The domino theory, so feared in the Vietnam era, came to fruition in the financial markets as hot money fled the region even faster than it entered. The culmination came a year later, following the Russian ruble collapse, which triggered the Long-Term Capital Management near-meltdown.

That's prologue to the present situation. In contrast to a decade ago, emerging economies around the globe, from Asia to Latin America to Europe, generally run substantial trade surpluses and are accumulating vast foreign-exchange reserves. The main reason: to forestall a rise in their own currency's exchange rate, which would harm their economies' export competitiveness.

As under the original Bretton Woods system, the signal aspect of Bretton Woods II is the willingness on the part of foreigners to hold U.S. dollars. In the current regime, that's meant recycling their mounting surpluses mainly into U.S. Treasury and agency securities, providing cheap financing for the budget deficit, American homeowners and the capital markets.

But, as in the early 1970s, the rest of the world is balking at continuing to accumulate dollars at the same pace as before. Bridgewater Associates' Bob Prince and Jason Rotenberg write in the money manager's Daily Observations letter that private-sector accumulation of dollars abroad overseas has been essentially nil.

Central banks have been forced to step into the breach, buying the dollars needed to fund the U.S. current-account deficit, which is equal to about 7% of gross domestic product. In other words, America spends $1.07 for every dollar it earns. Foreign central banks lend us the difference, a form of vendor financing for all those goods produced abroad, especially oil.

In the process, China has accumulated $1.2 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves. Rather than keep piling up Treasuries ad infinitum, China will invest $3 billion of that in Blackstone, which sounds like a lot but equals 0.25% of its reserves.

Less well-publicized is that central banks are just saying "No" to piling up greenbacks. Not selling, mind you, as the disaster-movie scenario envisions; just accumulating at a slower rate.

There are signs that's beginning to happen, as the Bridgewater duo detail. In just the latest, this week Syria became the second Middle Eastern nation to abandon its currency's peg to the dollar, which followed a similar move by Kuwait last month. Meanwhile, a parade of countries has directed an increasing portion of their reserves away from dollars and euros. Among them, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, plus America's good friends, Venezuela and Russia. And China announced this week said it, too, will increase the euro's share of its currency cache -- not reducing dollars, but not adding to them as much.

Syria? United Arab Emirates? When the dollar was being attacked in the early 'Seventies, the dollar was losing value against the Italian lira, long considered a joke among currencies. Informed of this, Nixon was famously captured on the Watergate tapes as saying, "I don't give a f--- about the lira." Later, the dollar would plunge, sending the price of everything, notably oil, soaring. (Question: which was more traumatic back then, Watergate or gas lines and soaring unemployment?)

Conversely, in recent years, if there's ever been a free lunch, the dollar has come closest for America. Because the rest of the world wants greenbacks for transactions or as a store of wealth, the U.S. can print dollars to cover the gap between what the nation spends and what it earns.

But as foreign central banks have become less ardent accumulators of dollars of late, U.S. Treasury security yields have been marching higher. Sure, the bond market has gotten over the notion that the Federal Reserve will cut rates any time soon. More particularly, as bonds have retreated, the dollar's recent recovery has stalled. Could there be a connection?

Bretton Woods II essentially translates into foreigners' absorbing a nearly infinite supply of dollars, which they recycle into the credit markets, funding everything from subprime mortgages to private-equity LBOs to the budget deficit.

They'll do that as long as it serves their purpose, mainly to keep their currencies in check to keep their exports strong. Once it no longer suits them, they'll withdraw from Bretton Woods II just as they did with the original. And U.S. bonds and stocks won't like it.