Buffett's Saintly Proposal - Part 2

Answering Part 1 by my acquantiance: "If you took the stated book value of BRK and then adjusted it by adding in the value of the float from the insurance business ( which essentially was free capital for Buffett to allocate as long as the loss ratio was below 100 ) you could buy Berkshire for roughly 1X adjusted book. I thought that was a pretty good deal and the logic made sense to me [when I first looked it several years ago]. I could effectively hire Warren to manage my money on a dollar for dollar basis, no management fee!

At this point, I have a pretty substantial gain in BRK and I am concerned what Hillary/Obama and a Democrat [party] congress might do to me. They seem determined to raise taxes on capital and drive more capital and jobs overseas as a result. I love to point to Ireland as the antithesis of this warped way of thinking. Low taxes and favorable treatment of capital attracts capital and creates jobs. You know this as well as I do of course. Anyway - long winded way of saying I'm not sure what I might do with my holdings given the valuation, Warren's age, and the chance that taxes may go up. I would like to re-run the analysis on the value of the float however. It is an interesting viewpoint."

My response to the idea that BRK was still a good value:

"Your analysis / logic of BRK and mine are about the same. I read everything ever written on Warren Buffett during the mid 1990s. I became quite a student on his technique, and by extension, his mentor (Ben Graham). But, I also read the quips that he thought his own company was overvalued and wouldn't buy it himself. But you did choose the right time to buy (2002-03) his stock. That was near the end of a eight plus year plateau in BRK during the dot com bubble when insurance and consumer durables were too boring and that culminated with Katrina and concerns over his exposure through General RE. That period included a few mistakes like US Air and Solomon Bros that damaged his reputation as the untouchable / invincible investor.

But since that time, the B shares have spiked from $2000 to $5000 over a two year period as he has come back into vogue with his timely utility, CNOOC and railroad investments. At the same time, nothing special happened with BRK's fundamental value to justify that spike (the deals that went his way did not double the cash flow). This is a company that probably can't grow earnings / cash flow more than 10 to 12% annually, just based on its size, no matter how smart individual deals. So, a 150% pop in stock price has probably taken it past fair value. But I haven't done the analysis either, so can't say that for certain. I am also concerned about his age, and, irrationally, his politics.

You express concern about Hil-Obama. But Warren is a major benefactor to Hillary's campaign, and would back Obama, if not Hillary. He also came out with the ridiculous and dishonest position supporting raising income taxes on the wealthy, even though he shows very little income the way he compensates himself (minimized by paying no dividend). He is a hypocrite on this point and it was a big disappoint to me when he took this position. I wonder if he would support a wealth tax just as readily. The idea that the government can do a better job taking care of society than people of means, like himself, is against what he has always stood for. If he really believes his own hyperbole, Buffett should have just donated his wealth to the government rather than to the Gates Foundation. It would be more genuine for him to campaign for be tter treatment of charitable giving than to bash wealth. (BTW...he was notorious for being a skinflint and not giving anything to charity until the last few years when he finally realized he couldn't take it with him)."

On BRK and Buffett's Proposal to "Assist" the Mortgage Insurers

In response to a positive comment from an investor acquaintance on Berkshire Hathway, Warren Buffett's investment vehicle:

So, you have thrown in the towel and are riding Buffet's coattails? I know that is enticing. I had BRK-B until a few weeks ago when I sold it to raise cash. It was one of my few winning positions. But I thought at that time (near $5000) that it was probably a little overvalued and I had owned it since the low $3000s. People pay a big premium for BRK, more than the sum of the parts. Some of those parts won't be doing well for a while. He owns a lot of homebuilding materials companies, including furniture. His newspapers probably aren't worth too much any more, either.

The best time to buy BRK the past few years was after Katrina, when all the insurers got knocked down. That is when we got in. BRK has to have some very bad news to lose any of its market premium, there are so many people that want to own it. Maybe there will be enough bad news in consumer durables that will cause BRK to lose some premium, at least that has been my thinking. It is too big to grow much on its own, so it has become more of a valuation game to make money on BRK. (Buffett himself has said in the past at times that he would not buy BRK based on its over-valuation).

I think his proposal to reinsure the bond insurers (AMBAC, MBIA, PMI, etc), but only the municipal bond pool, is very interesting. Reinsuring something that doesn't need insurance in the first place is quite the joke. It is a typical Buffett move, intended to give him a lot of money, quickly, at very low risk. He is asking for $12B (1 1/2%) for extending 30 days of protection on a portfolio that is not at risk (the $800B of AAA municipal bonds insured by the group). But his proposal does not address the real problem with the bond insurers, the CDOs, et al.

It seems to me that if the insurers take the deal, they are admitting defeat: they are in such bad shape that only their very best, the municipal bonds, is worth anything at all, the rest is worth nothing. If the insurers tank, it will cause significant additional damage to the financial markets, and to the economy by extension. While I don't blame Buffett for trying to extort the insurers (that is exactly what this is), they should turn him down and work on deals that address their real problems.

They do need a capital infusion (Buffet's proposal does not provide them any more permanent capital, but only temporarily shifts capital coverage requirements) and a return of confidence by the market, but the best way is a gradual unwind of their positions in a rational way rather than a fire sale of their best assets as in a "going out of business" sale. They can always find a buyer for a municipal bond insurance portfolio.