The Great Debate: Is the Fed Too Loose or Too Tight?

I have had a running debate with other blogsters regarding the current Fed policy of loose money. Being a student of history, especially the Great Depression, I know that one of the biggest factors contributing to the Depression was the fact a conservative (Hoover-led) government, Treasury and Federal Reserve kept money tight after the stock market broke down in October 1929. In fact, the Fed raised its Federal Funds rate in 1930 as it reacted to the perceived inflationary threat showing up in reports from data generated in 1928 and 1929 during the Roaring 20s Bubble.

I have contended that as assets aggressively contract, primarily real estate the past two years, some offset is needed to balance the national books. Otherwise, we have a deflation by definition (to little money chasing too many goods) and deflation is never a good thing as it causes people to save excessively (hoard) and not spend. This stops the economy and also feeds on itself. Some of my blog opponents feel that we should just let Free Markets work; that the market will do a better job of solving our problems than government. But history shows otherwise. A free market is a great thing during normal times, but it is too severe a master during times of stress.

To help me make my point, I am borrowing a column from "Barrons Online" posted yesterday. It says all that I have been trying to say, but more eloquently. Here it is:

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2008
UP AND DOWN WALL STREET DAILY

Pushing on a String or at the End of Their Rope?
By RANDALL W. FORSYTH

Sado-monetarists decry the doubling of the Fed's balance sheet, but is it enough?

THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE begins a two-day policy meeting Tuesday amid what now is conceded to be the worst financial crisis since 1930s. And, as in the Great Depression, the U.S. central bank is being criticized for being too easy and risking inflation amidst a severe debt deflation.

The Fed has doubled the size of its balance sheet in just seven weeks to attack the crisis. That has elicited squawks from what Barron's much-missed late friend and colleague, John Liscio, called the "sado-monetarists" who think that the central bank's efforts to cushion the pain of credit contraction invariably puts us on the road to perdition. As when he coined the phrase back in the early 1990s, the Fed is expanding its credit to offset the contraction in credit in the private sector.

Michael T. Darda, chief economist of MKM Partners, notes the Fed has expanded its balance sheet by $900 billion since early September, a seeming eternity ago when the Mets were cruising to the post-season and temperatures were sizzling. But that seemingly Zimbabwe-like 206% annual rate of increase in the Fed's assets in the latest 26 weeks hasn't ignited a monetary inflation. Quite the opposite, in fact.

A record percentage -- nearly 25% -- of the high-powered money the Fed has provided effectively sit idle as excess reserves, Darda points out. In other words, banks are sitting on a huge precautionary cushion. Banks are hoarding cash and are loath to lend to each other except for overnight periods.

That means banks are unlikely to unleash a new, inflationary wave of lending; quite the opposite. Yet the high levels of excess reserves in 1937 caused the sado-monetarists of the day to sound the inflation alarm back then and spur the Fed to tighten. That aborted the recovery and extended the depression, resulting in a resumption of the bear market. (Note: check out long term stock price charts and you will clearly see how the stock market cratered in 1937 due to this Fed tightening).

This time around, the deflationary symptoms are everywhere. Industrial commodity prices have been halved while the 30-year Treasury bond yield has sunk to its lowest level ever, under 4% last week. Gold has plunged to around $700 an ounce from $1,000 while the dollar has surged. And risky asset classes have melted down, he notes.

While the Fed is pumping more reserves into the banking system, less is being transformed into broad money and credit. And that money is turning over more slowly (velocity is falling, to use the economists' jargon.) The combination renders Fed policy "far less potent than it would otherwise be," Darda concludes.

That leaves the question, what's the FOMC to do at this point? The consensus of Fed watchers and the futures market is that the panel will cut its federal-funds rate target another 50 basis points (half percentage point) to 1% when it announces its decision Wednesday at 2:15 PM EDT. That would leave the Fed's main policy rate at its previous nadir touched in the past cycle and would, in effect, leave it relatively few basis points left to cut before the funds rate reached zero.

"The question is what the Fed does next," write ISI's Washington policy analysts, Tom Gallagher, Andy Laperriere and Melissa Loesberg. "We think it might have one more conventional rate cut before resorting to unconventional measures. But the real answer is that the Fed will wait for fiscal policymakers to take their turn," they conclude. (Note: this will come in the form of another national "special rebate" of around $1000-1500 that will be passed by Congress during a special session in November and distributed in time to impact Christmas spending, so I predict).

Goldman Sachs' economists also look for a 50 basis point cut from the FOMC but think a 75-basis-point slash, halving the fed-funds rate to 0.75%, is a 33% possibility. An important factor in the FOMC's decision will be the results of the Fed's latest quarterly survey of bank loan officers, which Goldman notes the policy makers will have in hand. This survey, taken in September, will be made public next month. The previous survey released in August showed a sharp tightening in credit standards for consumer, mortgage and business loans.

In other words, the Fed has been pushing on a proverbial string.
More than pure quantitative measures, price indicators show persistent credit tightness. Spreads between market interest rates and risk-free or administered rates have come in from their peaks, but remain elevated.

In particular, the three-month London interbank rate has come down to around 3.50% as of Monday, from the peak of about 4.80% on Oct. 10, but this benchmark remains above the 2.80% that prevailed in September before the Lehman bankruptcy and the Fed's 50-basis-point cut, to 1.5%, on Oct. 8. (Note: Why is Libor still so high, when the Fed keeps pushing the Funds Rate lower? The answer is that banks don't want to lend to each other, or are afraid to, after so much bank carnage. This means that what interbank lending does occur, does so at a higher interest rate than in a freer, less risky market. This impacts us because Libor is the index for many consumer loans and mortgages, and is also a barometer of economic health).

Three-month Libor also remains elevated against OIS -- the overnight interbank swap rate, which reflects the market's view on the fed-funds effective rate. The Libor-OIS spread is down to 263 basis points from a peak of 366 basis points on Oct. 10. But before the crisis, when banks were willing to lend to each other, Libor-OIS was a relatively trivial handful of basis points.

Getting Libor down is a more important, though less visible aim of the FOMC. The Fed's program to purchase commercial paper, which commenced Monday, should take further pressure off the money market. The Fed initially set a rate of 1.88% for top-grade three-month paper Monday, far below Libor, which should help to continue pull the interbank rate lower, according to Banc of America Securities' head of credit research, Jeffrey Rosenberg.

The Fed's unprecedented push of liquidity may have nearly doubled its balance sheet but it still has not offset the private sector's need, according to Bridgewater Associates. The world has accumulated so many dollar debts, and the ability to refinance and expand these debts was so ingrained in the financial system that its breakdown requires an unprecedented response from the Fed. But with so much of the global financial system out of the reach of central banks, the risks to policy makers are numerous.

With debt deflation engulfing the credit markets and the economy here and abroad, the sado-monetarists should get over their Whip Inflation Now fetishes.